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INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with and limited to the recovery of
compensatory damages for pain and suffering, which accompany
and relate to a bodily injury. There shall be no discussion of trau-
matic neurosis as it relates to this area of recovery, since that sub-
ject is well-deserving of separate treatment.
It would be superfluous to cite authority for the proposition that
one may recover damages for "pain and suffering" resulting from a
bodily injury. As is often generally stated, such a recovery encom-
passes past, present and future pain and suffering; however, courts
have varied greatly in their degree of analysis and sophistication to
ward the many problems inhering in this area of damage law. No
doubt such variances are due in large measure to the incisiveness or
lack of incisiveness on the part of counsel coming before their re-
spective bars. The Colorado courts have not been overly extended
in their consideration of this area.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION AND CATEGORIZATION
Perhaps the most striking and immediate problem is that relat-
ing to definition and semantics. Pain, grief, fright, humiliation,
anxiety, mortification, nervousness, vexation and anguish are but a
few of the common expressions used to describe forms of human
suffering. Even if it could be said that certain forms of suffering are
universally compensable and that other forms of suffering are uni-
versally not compensable, there would still exist the tremendous
dilemma of adequate classification and distinction. Surely, as the
medical specialist gains insight into the recesses of the human mind,
these broad categorizations become less and less meaningful and
functional.
The Colorado courts have traditionally given and approved the
DICTA
JULY-AuGUST 1959
broadest type of instruction regarding pain and suffering. There
has been a strong tendency to make simple reference to pain and
suffering without limitation, illustration or definition. Early cases
suggested that a recovery was permitted for "bodily suffering," no
mention being made of "mental suffering.", Somewhat later cases
indicate tacit approval of instructions allowing jury consideration
of "bodily pain and mental suffering. ' 2 More recently, the cases re-
cite instructions including notions of "physical and mental pain and
anguish."3 This, of course, allows the jury tremendous latitude (and
lack of direction) where opposing counsel have not sought a more
definitive set of instructions.
Recognizing the inadequacy of classification, we shall, never-
theless, consider the attitude of courts toward some of the various
types of suffering.
1. Pain and the Mental Awareness of Pain. All courts agree that
a recovery may be had for the pain attending the injury proper. This
type of reaction might verbally be described, from a layman's point
of view, as aching, throbbing, and burning sensations.4 Some juris-
dictions which have considered the problem of pain and suffering
during unconsciousness have determined that there can be little or
no suffering under such circumstances.5 These holdings represent a
crude analysis, for while there might be no conscious suffering dur-
ing periods of "unconsciousness," there may, nevertheless, be sub-
surface anguish and reaction. These few cases do not distinguish
forms or types of non-consciousness, e.g., coma or sleep. Compensa-
tion for pain, per se, can become somewhat more accurate and finite
as those who are expert in such matters educate juries on investiga-
tions and research into individual tolerances and pain thresholds.
2. Humiliation. There is some disagreement as to whether or
not suffering in the form of humiliation is a compensable area of
recovery when attendant upon physical injury. Most courts today
permit such a recovery in all types of cases involving physical in-
jury whether or not the injury was attributable to a negligent or in-
tended act.6 Other courts have permitted an award for humiliation
only where the act complained of was attended by circumstances of
willfulness or wantonness or have indicated that no recovery is per-
mitted without specifically discussing the possibility of exceptions
to their generalization. 7 The problem of compensation for humilia-
tion usually arises in disfigurement cases.
1 Wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 465 (1882).
2 E.g., Denver Tramway Co. v. Martin, 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908).
3 King v. Avila, 127 Colo. 538, 259 P.2d 268 (1953); Murraw v. Whiteley, 125 Colo. 392, 244 P.2d
657 (1952); Gerick v. Brock, 120 Colo. 394, 210 P.2d 214 (1949).
4 See excellent analysis in Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So.2d 541 (1951).
5 Stone v. Sinclair Refining Co., 229 Mich. 103, 200 N.W. 948 (1924); Fries v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
R.R., 159 Minn. 328, 198 N.W. 998 (1924); see Vanderlippe v. Midwest Studies, Inc., 137 Neb. 289,
289 N.W. 341 (1939) (holding, in effect, that there could be no recovery for pain while under the influ-
ence of a morphine sedative).
6 See Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So. 2d 541 (1951). In this Mississippi case involving per-
sonal injuries arising out of a claim founded in negligence the trial court instructed the jury that there
could be no recovery for mental suffering after the Physical pain of the injury had ceased. The appellate
court reversed the trial court, holding there could be a recovery for humiliation arising as a reaction to
disfigurement, thus overruling a long line of contrary Mississippi cases. And see Grenawalt v. Nyhuis,
335 Mich. 76, 55 N.W.2d 736 (1952) (plaintiff recovered for humiliation caused by a hairdresser's negli-
gence resulting in plaintiff's inability to dye her hair from its premature white color as she had done
for some twenty years); Erie Railroad Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920); Restatement, Torts § 905(b)
and illustration 3 (1939).
7 See Halliday v. Ingram, 78 R.I. 464, 82 A.2d 875 (1957) (negligence action; award refused for
alleged facial disfigurement of seven-year-old girl); Hoffman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 255 S.W.2d
736 (Mo. 1953) (no recovery permitted in negligence case for twenty-six-year-old woman's alleged
embarrassment over the possibility of her sterility).
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Decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court have seemingly leaned
toward the view that humiliation does not constitute an element of
award, absent a willful or wanton act, where such humiliation is
precipitated by physical injury. In Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harry-
man8 our -court held that there was insufficient evidence upon
which to base a recovery for humiliation, even though the plaintiff's
leg was shortened three-eights inch to one inch because of injuries
sustained. That court effectively determined that no reasonable
man could suffer mental embarrassment over the mere shortening
of a leg, at least not sufficient embarrassment to warrant compensa-
tion. By way of dictum, the court strongly hinted that even if a
proper case for humiliation were made out there could be no such
recovery unless the tortious conduct of the defendant had been col-
ored by malice or indifference.9
It is interesting to note that the Colorado court has permitted
damages for humiliation in many situations not involving or accom-
panying physical harm. These are all instances where the very tor-
tious act of the defendant portended humiliation on the part of the
plaintiff.10 These cases are interesting because they defy the ration-
ale of the Diamond Rubber case wherein that court suggested that
damages for humiliation are too uncertain. 1 If damages of this na-
ture are not too uncertain in one instance, why should they be too
uncertain in another instance? The incidence of maliciousness
and/or willfulness would not make the element of damages for hu-
miliation more certain, although, in terms of social policy, such dam-
ages might be more desirable." It is indeed unlikely that the pres-
ent incumbents of the Colorado Supreme Court would support the
philosophy of the Diamond Rubber case.
3. Anxiety over Possible Consequences of the Injury. Most
courts permit recovery for that anxiety which can be reasonably re-
lated to the physical injury.13 While courts will recognize variations
in sensitivities of different individuals, the plaintiff's anxiety must
not be totally unrealistic or abnormal.' 4 There appears to be no
Colorado case with a square holding or analysis of this point in phys-
ical injury case. 15
4. Vexation and Annoyance. Courts are not disposed to allow a
recovery for mere collateral annoyance even though attributable to
8 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907).
9 Id. at 427, 92 Pac. at 926. And see the further suggestion of approval of this postion in Denver
Tramway Co. v. Martin, 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908), where the court noted that "fright" is a well
recognized element of compensable suffering, but indicated a less kindly disposition tpward "humilia-
tion"; cf Jones v. Franklin, 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 464 (May 25, 1959) (court approved instructions
calling for an award for fear, anxiety, indignity, and disgrace in an assault and battery case); Blecker
v. Colorado & So. R.R., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911) (court attempted to distinguish the Diamond
Rubber case); Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 156, 300 Pac. 601 (1931) (court's instruction
possibly indicates a contrary attitude).
10 Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932); Sager v. Sisters of
Mercy, 81 Colo. 498, 256 Pac. 8 (1927); Westessen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689
(1925); cf Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).
11 41 Colo. at 427, 92 Pac. at 926.
2 See comment on rule of certainty in pain and suffering case in Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457,
135 P.2d 283, 290 (1943). This case also contains an excellent review of recovery for humiliation in
disfigurement cases.
13 E.g., Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 53 A.2d 645 (1947) (plaintiff allowed to recover for anxiety
based on fear of epilepsy from brain laceration); Carter v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 47
N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d 15 (1957) (plaintiff's recovery based on worry over health of unborn baby
sustained); accord, Fehely v. Senders, su'pra note 12; see Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1104, 1109-13 (1943); Re-
statement, Torts § 905, comment e (1939) (which tends to be hesitant and vague as to requisites for
an anxiety award).
14 Restatement, Torts § 905, comment i (1939).
15 But see cases cited note 9 supro.
DICTA
JULY-AucUST 1959
the defendant's acts. While the courts have again waved the flag of
uncertainty and difficulty of pecuniary measurement,' the more
reasonable basis for a refusal to allow an award in this area would
seem to be founded on concepts of public policy and reasonable limi-
tations on the scope of liability.
5. Loss of Capacity to Work. There is almost universal accept-
ance of the principle that a housewife cannot recover for loss of time
or theoretical earnings on account of her inability to pursue her
household chores, as distinguished from any employment outside the
home. Of course, a husband is permitted a recovery for the loss of
his wife's services in the home. Colorado courts have admitted evi-
dence on this point under several theories. Evidence as to loss of
capacity to work, as compared to loss of earnings, has been allowed
to demonstrate the nature of the housewife's physical condition be-
fore and after a given personal injury.17 Such evidence has also
been admitted on the theory that such a loss of capacity causes men-
tal suffering on the part of the housewife."' Precedents for this posi-
tion are found in a long line of Georgia cases 0 and it appears that
the Colorado position derived from one such Georgia decision.
FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING
1. The Problem of Proof. While there is general acceptance that
future pain and suffering are compensable, there is no universal
agreement as to the degree and nature of proof required to sustain
such a recovery.
2 0
Most states appear committed to the rule that future pain and
suffering must appear to be a reasonable certainty. -1 A minority of
states merely require that there be a reasonable probability of fu-
ture pain and suffering.2 2 Colorado has indicated a preference for
the "reasonable certainty" rule..2 3
There is further disagreement among states following the "rea-
sonable certainty" rule with regard to the admission of opinion evi-
dence. Some cases distinctly hold that testimony couched in terms
indicating less than such a certainty of future pain and suffering is
inadmissible and possible grounds for reversible error..2 4 Other cases
have held that testimony indicating possibility of future pain is ad-
missible and is sufficient to create a jury issue.21 It would appear
that a rational view would admit any related testimony on future
pain, and at the close of the evidence determine as a matter of law
whether or not the matter should be taken from the jury.2-'
16 O'Conner v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 2 So. 2d 234, 237 (La. 1941) (mental suffering
from having to forego a vacation because of injuries, too speculative and uncertain).
17 Colorado Springs & Interurban R.R. v. Nichols, 41 Colo. 272, 92 Pac. 691 (1907); Colorado Springs
& Interurban R.R. v. Marr. 26 Colo. App. 48, 141 Poc. 142 (1914).
18 Colorado Springs & Interurban R.R. v. Nichols, supra note 17, at 276.
10 E.g., Chanley v. Shirah, 96 Go. App. 91, 99 S.E.2d 365 (1957).
20 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423 (1932).
21 Id. at 439-67.
2'- Id. at 467-70; see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McAlister, 256 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
23 Cookman v. Caidwell, 64 Cola. 206, 170 Pac. 952 (1918).
24 Haase v. Ryan, 100 Ohio App. 285, 136 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1955) (doctor's testimony that plaintiff
"may" have headaches, dizzy spells and change of personality resulting in part from an intracraniar
hemorrhage held inadmissible and prejudicial error); accord, Gray v. Richardson, 313 III. App. 626, 40
N.E.2d 598 (1942).
25 McDuffie v. Root, 300 Mich. 286, 1 N.W.2d 544, 548 (1942) (doctor's testimony that plaintiff's
headaches "might" continue as a result of skull fracture held sufficient to send future pain issue to
jury although court subscribed to "reasonable certainty" rule).




Almost all jurisdictions observe the principle that neither ex-
pert nor lay testimony is required on the issue of future pain and
suffering, if the nature of the injury suggests only one reasonable
conclusion-that there will be extended suffering. 27 If future pain
and suffering are not apparent to the layman, then their reasonably
certain (or probable) occurrence must be adequately proved by ex-
pert opinion.28 There need be no permanent injury to provide the
basis for a recovery for future pain; any pain and suffering lasting
beyond the day of trial is compensable and sufficient.
29
2. Instruction on Nature and Degree of Proof. Even those courts
which require that future pain and suffering be a "reasonable cer-
tainty" have tended to be generous in tolerating loose and vague in-
structions on this point. Many courts have approved instructions
which lack the magic words "reasonable certainty." These appellate
courts have declined to reverse where instructions spoke in terms
of future pain and suffering that "may occur," "are likely to occur,"
27 Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1149, 1151-54 (1938).
28 Id. at 1154-58.
29 Annot., 81 A.LR. 423, 434-36 (1932); see Dunham v. Stone, 96 N.H. 138, 71 A.2d 412 (1950).
Every day...







"are reasonably likely to occur," or "probably will occur. ' 30 There
are few Colorado cases concerned directly with the propriety and
precise wording of such an instruction 3 1 although it is to be noted
that the words "reasonably certain" do not appear in the reported
cases which recite the instructions on pain and suffering.
3 2 Most
courts which have permitted "loose" instructions have done so on
grounds that no prejudicial error has been committed, although
they have also indicated that such instructions are less than
proper.
33
3. Per Diem Analysis. There is still great indecision and con-
flict in that phase of pain and suffering dealing with the permissi-
blity of a per diem analysis. There has been little approval of at-
tempts by counsel to have per diem formulae included as part of
the instructions to the jury.3 4 However, some courts have permitted
counsel to argue and suggest per diem awards in their presentations
to the jury.3 5 Other courts have found that such statements intrude
on the domain of the jury.36 This latter position seems unreasonably
static and rigid; the very lack of adequate measurability would
seem to suggest a need for fair comment by counsel on possible
evaluating techniques. Certainly the jury should not be encouraged
to select compensation awards with a wave of a magic wand, and
counsel should have the opportunity to frame and focus the jury's
contemplation of pain and suffering, although this is not to imply
that a jury should ever be bound to strict formulization. The prob-
lem is one of jury direction, not jury sterilization or usurpation.
4. Reduction of Award to Present Worth. The vast majority of
states require that awards for loss of future earning capacity be re-
duced to their present worth. Most of these states, however, rec-
ognize that it is not necessary to reduce the award for future pain
and suffering to a present value amount.3 7 The gist of the commen-
30 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423, 450-60. This annotation includes cases holding for and against this type of
instruction.
31 See Union Gold Mining Co. v. Crawford, 29 Cola. 571, 69 Pac. 600 (1902).
32 Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 156, 300 Pac. 601 (1931) ("may"); Denver Tramway
Co. v. Martin, 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908) ("may"). Most local courts use an instruction which
refers to pain and mental suffering and mental anguish presently and in the future "to be endured,"
e.g., Murrow v. Whiteley, 125 Colo. 392, 244 P.2d 657 (1952).
33 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423.
34 See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1347-52 (1958).
85 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1959).
36 See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1957); Ahlstrom v. Minnesota, St. P. & S. St.
M. R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955).
37 See Annot., 28 A.L.R. 1177, 1178-79 (1924).
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tary on this latter point indicates that there is no logic in reducing
damages of this nature to present value because there is no loss of
actual anticipated pecuniary benefit.3 8 Further, the amount found
to compensate one for pain and suffering is based on the broadest
and most abstract type of jury thinking, and it becomes absurd to
dissect this area of recovery by use of detailed formulae3 9 which
take into consideration capitalization rates and tax structure. Thus,
the monetary worth of pain and suffering is left to the enlightened
conscience of the jury. Those few jurisdictions which take the posi-
tion that pain and suffering damages must be reduced to present
value are often ill-advised in terms of faulty analysis of preced-
ents." There are no Colorado cases in this immediate area.
CONCLUSION
One may well wonder if the average juror would seriously pon-
der and take into consideration a detailed set of instructions regard-
ing compensation for pain and suffering. Certainly we can predict
that his approach would be less than scientific and mathematically
exact. Nevertheless, instructions delineating the scope and area of
recoverable pain and suffering, setting forth the degree of necessary
proof, and reciting the non-necessity of a present value approach
would appear to be of psychological import in framing the juror's
overall approach to recoveries in this phase of personal injury law.
Increased definition with regard to awards for Dain and suffer-
ing would, at the very least, guide and focus counsel in their prep-
aration of admissible evidence as it relates to such pain and suffer-
ing. Unfortunately, the Colorado Supreme Court has had few
opportunities to develop any refinements in the area of pain and
suffering recovery. It may be that our present enlightened Court
would welcome such opportunities.
38 E.g., Louisville and N.R.R. v. Gayle, 204 Ky. 142, 263 S.W. 763 (1924).
39 E.g., Chicago and N.W.R.R. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1922).
40 See Sweeney v. Moreland Bros. Co., 227 Mich. 203, 198 N.W. 932 (1924); O'Brien v. Loeb, 229
Mich. 405, 201 N.W. 488 (1924) (holding pain and suffering must be reduced to present worth). These
cases rely on Denman v. Johnston, 85 Mich. 387, 48 N.W. 565 (1891) (where the recovery was only for
future loss of earnings, not pain and'suffering). See also Lamont v. Highsmith Hospital Inc., 206 N.C.
111, 173 S.E. 46 (1934) and Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948) taking the
Michigan position, These latter cases can be traced to supposed precedence of the holding in Chesa-
peake and O.R.R. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916) (the court in that case was concerned with a statute that
only permitted recovery for pecuniary loss to dependents of the deceased). Cf. Texas and P.R.R. v.
Buckles, 232 F.2d 257, cerf. den. 351 U.S. 954 (1956) (holding no present worth reduction for permitted
pain and suffering award).
Expert e Commercial Printing
Brief Printers * Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books- Magazines
* Books- Book Binding
THE * House Organs
S e PRESS 2400 CURTIS STREET
AM 6-3277 PDenver, Colorado
DICTA
